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I. Introduction 
When Representative Mike Coffman was elected to serve Colorado’s 6th Congressional 
District in 2008 he won with a 22-point margin, in what was a very safe Republican district. In 
2014 Representative Coffman kept his seat in a much more competitive election against a well-
funded opponent. Representative Coffman successfully held onto his district, despite a large 
change in its composition. As a result of the 2012 redistricting and some other demographic 
factors, the Colorado 6th moved from a safe Republican district to a marginally Democratic 
district. Like many Representatives in the US Congress, Representative Coffman faced 
significant changes to the political composition of his district due to redistricting. But unlike 
some, Representative Coffman was able to survive reelection in a very vulnerable seat. I want to 
examine how Members of Congress like Representative Coffman adapt to changing districts. 
Specifically I am interested in explaining how Members of Congress change their legislative 
behavior in response to changes in district partisanship. Legislative behavior encompasses the 
different choices a Member of Congress (MC) makes when voting, sponsoring legislation, 
making floor speeches, and issuing press releases. 
Previous research in this area has focused on how MCs specifically change their voting 
behavior to respond to constituents. For this paper, I chose to focus specifically on MCs who 
were particularly vulnerable to changes in their district. These MCs serve in politically volatile 
districts that are close to, or already have flipped to supporting the opposing party.  While 
changes in voting behavior can help explain how some MCs are able to hold despite changes in 
their districts, this is only part of the picture. Another equally important way that MCs can adapt 
to changing districts is by changing their cosponsorship behavior. What makes cosponsorship 
inherently different from voting is its more public nature. When a MC cosponsors a piece of 
legislation they are effectively taking ownership of that legislative issue. Cosponsorship also 
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indicates a stronger level of support for legislation than simply casting a vote in favor of a bill. 
By taking a strong ownership stance on particular legislative issues, MCs are able to show more 
substantial efforts to address their constituents’ interests than simply voting with their 
constituents. Cosponsorship also functions as a commitment mechanism to help build coalitions 
of like-minded Representatives. MCs looking to build a track record of bipartisanship can use 
cosponsorship to build alliances with members of another party.  
II. Abstract 
 
 I hypothesized that Members of Congress serving in politically volatile districts would 
increase their level of bipartisan cosponsorship in response to changes in district partisanship. 
Ultimately I found no significant relationship between changes in cosponsorship and changes in 
district partisanship, but I did find a strong relationship between raw cosponsorship scores and 
changes in district partisanship. This finding suggests that there is something unique about these 
volatile districts that motivates MCs to be more bipartisan. One possible explanation for this 
behavior is that these volatile districts themselves have a selection bias towards electing 
bipartisan legislators. Another possible explanation is that legislators serving in these volatile 
districts are gradually narrowed out until a bipartisan legislator emerges.  
I start this thesis with a review of the relevant literature on the marginality hypothesis, 
redistricting, cosponsorship, and other aspects of Congressional behavior. The previous literature 
shows both some support for and support against my hypothesis. In my theory section I expand 
on my hypothesis and explain how and why I chose to look specifically at volatile districts in my 
study. I also expand more on how cosponsorship differs from other types of legislative behavior. 
In my research design section I explain the regression model used in this paper, and why I chose 
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that method. Finally in the results and discussion section I expand on my findings and outline 
topics for future research.  
II. Literature Review 
 
Three key areas of existing literature in political science are crucial to understanding the 
relationship between cosponsorship and district partisanship. The first body of research on this 
topic has focused on the “marginality hypothesis” which examines whether MCs who win by 
narrower margins tend to be more responsive to constituent preferences on certain policy issues. 
The literature in this area is very mixed with some studies finding proof for the relationship 
(Sullivan and Uslander 1978, Griffin 2006, Campbell 1981), some studies finding no relationship 
(Fiorina 1973, Kuklinsky 1997, Cohen and Brunk 1983), and one finding the inverse holds true 
(Huntington 1950). The second body of literature focuses on how incumbent MCs are able to 
hold on to their seats. Whether through transfer payment voting (Hibbing 1984), funneling pork 
into their districts (Bickers and Stein 1996), performing constituent services (Alford and Hibbing 
1981), or party disloyalty (Deckard 1976) incumbents can employ a variety of tactics to retain 
control of their seats. The third body of research focuses on cosponsorship and its impact on 
legislation. By building large networks of cosponsors, MCs are able to increase the likelihood 
that bills they sponsor become law (Fowler 2006). In another study, Laurel Harbridge (2009) 
found MCs attempting to establish bipartisan credentials are more likely to engage in bipartisan 
cosponsorship rather than bipartisan roll call voting. Finally Sulkin and Bernhard find that 
cosponsorship agreements function as a “commitment mechanism” (2013, pg. 2) to keep MCs 
honest.  
The Marginality Hypothesis: How do legislators respond to constituents? 
The marginality hypothesis suggests that MCs that win by smaller electoral margins will 
tend to support positions more in line with those of their constituents. Early research on the 
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marginality hypothesis focused on state legislatures. While the relationship has been confirmed 
in state-level analysis of electoral margins, the results have been mixed as scholars have 
attempted to study the relationship at the federal level. Part of the reason for this variance in 
results is due to the different timeframes that studies focus on. Previous studies focused primarily 
on the 1950s through the 1970s, a time in Congress where regional factors also strongly 
determined constituent behavior. Unlike these studies my paper focused on the 1982, 1992, and 
2002 redistricting periods. During this timeframe regional factors were not as strong as during 
previous eras, allowing for a better test of legislative behavior. 
Among the studies that confirm the marginality hypothesis, John Sullivan and Eric 
Uslaner (1978) found that in districts with smaller margins of victory, the candidate that is 
closest ideologically to the constituency tends to win. However they find that incumbents tend to 
have a higher chance of winning reelection, regardless of whether or not they vote with their 
constituency. Their study focused on the 89th and 90th Congresses (1965-1969), using survey 
responses to establish ideology scores for incumbents, opponents, and constituencies. 
While only finding a weak relationship during the same period, James Campbell (1978) 
argued that electoral competition encourages MCs to respond to constituents. Though Campbell 
qualifies this by asserting that the impact of electoral competition on legislative behavior is 
ultimately determined by what category a MC falls into. MCs that serve in very marginal, very 
safe, or “equilibrium” districts weigh constituent desires, but ultimately respond to other factors 
when making policy decisions. Among MCs that serve slightly marginal districts, Campbell 
finds the highest likelihood of responding to constituent positions. These MCs have the most to 
gain from changing their position, unlike their colleagues on the margins. 
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Finally John D. Griffin (2006) focuses on the 93rd-106th Congresses (1975-2001), studying 
the relationship between the responsiveness of representatives to their constituents and electoral 
margins. Griffin’s study compares the electoral competitiveness of districts to the ideology of 
MCs measured though roll call voting. He finds that MCs from more competitive districts tend to 
be more responsive to their constituents, especially when removing southern districts and 
midterm elections from the analysis. This paper focused on a similar timeframe and used similar 
measurements for district competitiveness, but instead examined cosponsorship behavior as a 
measurement of bipartisan legislative behavior. MCs in competitive districts want to establish 
strong bipartisan credentials, and thus sponsor more bipartisan legislation. In contrast, 
representatives in non-competitive districts will need to avoid bipartisan cosponsorship at all 
costs, and instead cosponsor more partisan legislation. 
In his study of the 89th and 90th Congresses (1965-1969) Morris P. Fiorina (1973) focused 
on a MC’s perception of winning reelection and its effects on voting behavior. His study found 
that even if a representative is not confident about their chances of being reelected, they will not 
adjust their voting behavior. Additionally Fiorina also found that instead of taking more middle-
of-the-road positions, MCs in more competitive districts actually tend to adopt the positions of 
extreme parts of their constituency.  
Finding further evidence against the marginality hypothesis, Jeffrey E. Cohen and 
Gregory G. Bunk (1983) found no connection between party loyalty and electoral margins in 
their study of MCs from the 83rd through 95th Congresses (1953-78). Their study compared 
election results (as a measure of marginality) against party loyalty scores. They used a MC’s 
perception that they are safe, based on changing margins of victory overtime, to examine how 
election results motivate party loyalty. Ultimately they found that even after accounting for 
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perceptions of safety, MCs do not change their party loyalty behavior in response to electoral 
margins. 
The mixed results of studies on the marginality hypothesis present an interesting 
opportunity for further research. Previous studies have found evidence both for and against the 
marginality hypothesis across different time periods, and at the state and federal level. By 
focusing on a different measurement of bipartisanship—cosponsorship behavior—this paper 
departs from previous studies. Because cosponsorship agreements constitute tacit agreements 
between MCs, they provide an excellent opportunity to form either partisan or bipartisan 
relationships. Whether a MC serves in a “safe” or “competitive” district, they will face 
significant incentives to establish beneficial relationships with other legislators. By forming 
legislative alliances, MCs increase their own power and influence, increasing their chances of 
winning reelection.  
Influencing Votes: How do Incumbents Stay in Office? 
 
Another related body of research focuses on the variables that influence incumbent 
reelection. One study, by Barbara S. Deckard (1976) focused on how vulnerable incumbents can 
benefit by going against their party. She found that only vulnerable Republicans benefit from 
partly disloyalty in a close election.  Deckard argues Republicans that represent districts that are 
“less Republican” in terms of demographics tend to benefit from disagreeing with their party on 
some issues. These vulnerable Republican MCs are even able to win by larger margins than their 
safer colleagues by going against their party. Deckard’s work suggests that by building bipartisan 
credentials, some vulnerable MCs are able to survive, even in very marginal elections.  
In his study of transfer payment voting programs, John R. Hibbing (1984) identifies two 
distinct motivations for MCs to engage in transfer payment voting. First Hibbing identifies that 
MCs engage in transfer payment voting for the short-term benefit to the local economy in their 
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district. Second, MCs will engage in transfer payment voting in an attempt to separate 
themselves from their opponents by using the power of their office to gain the support of certain 
groups, like veterans or seniors (who both often benefit from these types of programs). Hibbing’s 
findings show that MCs can change specific aspects of their legislative behavior to retain their 
seats, but this strategy is only successful when either a) a transfer payment voting bill is currently 
up for a vote or b) if their district has a large number of people who would benefit from the 
program.  
 In a related study, Bickers and Stein (1996) focused on how MCs are able to funnel pork 
barrel spending projects into their districts to ward of quality challengers. Their study found that 
after winning an open seat race, MCs attempt to direct Congressional spending into their districts 
to secure themselves against future challengers, especially if that MC won their seat by a narrow 
margin. They also found that while many MCs will attempt to use programs within the Small 
Business Administration to provide loans and support for small business in their district, 
discretionary awards that are awarded more generally are more effective at warding off strong 
opponents.    
 Incumbency advantage is another important factor than can help protect vulnerable MCs 
from being voted out of office. John R. Alford and John R. Hibbing (1981) found that 
incumbents did experience increasing electoral margins to due incumbency advantage, but that 
these gains tend to level off or even decrease with time. This becomes very important for 
incumbent MCs as they spend more time in Congress. As their legislative career continues, MCs 
cannot rely as much on incumbency advantage for protection in tough elections. This decrease in 
incumbency advantage then forces MCs to adopt different strategies to protect their seats. At this 
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point, MCs must turn to strategies like transfer payment voting, funneling pork, or adjusting their 
roll call voting or sponsorship behavior in an attempt to bolster public support.  
 MCs will also make strategic decisions on whether or not to communicate their stance on 
a particular issue to build constituent support according to Daniel Lipinski (2004). The two main 
reasons a MC publicizes their behavior, according to Lipinski, are either to take credit or to 
explain to their constituents why they voted a certain way. Lipinski argues that MCs will use 
targeted messaging like mass mailings to communicate information to their districts, but only 
when doing so may benefit them electorally. Members also base whether or not they will 
communicate their behavior based on the level of media coverage they have already received in 
their district. If the local news in a member’s district has already publicized their vote, the 
likelihood of that MC mentioning their vote in a mass mailing decreases. While Lipinski finds 
that MCs make strategic decisions to publicize their voting behavior, he also finds that 
sometimes this communication has unintended consequences. According to Lipinski, voters will 
place information they receive about their MC in the context of what they already know. So new 
information about improved behavior is sometimes not enough to protect a MC from being voted 
out of office. However, Lipinski still argues that, “members’ messages evaluating congressional 
performance can have a significant impact on elections.” (Lipinski 2004, p.100) Establishing a 
track record of bipartisanship would be crucial to any MC trying to appease a new, potentially 
hostile district. One avenue for establishing such a track record is engaging in bipartisan 
cosponsorship.   
Cosponsorship as a Commitment Mechanism 
Cosponsorship is one very important tool that MCs can use to establish bipartisan 
credentials in response to district preferences. Cosponsorship serves three crucial functions for 
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vulnerable MCs. First, MCs use cosponsorship to build networks with fellow legislators. The 
larger the network of cosponsors a specific MC can build, the more likely their bills will be made 
into law (Fowler 2006). Second, MCs can engage in cosponsorship to establish bipartisan 
credentials (Harbridge 2009). Third, cosponsorship agreements operate as commitment 
mechanism to force MCs to keep promises they make to other legislators.  
By reneging on cosponsorship agreements, MCs can face negative consequences from 
their colleagues, according to a study by William Bernhard and Tracy Sulkin (2013). They find 
that cosponsorship functions to guarantee commitment and allow MCs to develop alliances with 
other MCs. These alliances become crucial for MCs to find support for their own legislation. 
MCs have substantial incentive then not only to cosponsor legislation, but also to do so 
strategically. Cosponsorship then has two distinct benefits of MCs trying to secure victory 
against either a primary or a general election opponent. First, cosponsorship is one of many 
tactics a MC can employ to establish either the partisan or bipartisan credentials necessary to 
retain their seats. Second, active cosponsorship allows MCs to develop strong legislative 
networks, making it easier to pass their own bills. This encourages MCs to engage in 
cosponsorship to further their own legislative agenda.  
In a similar study, James Fowler (2006) found that MCs who were able to build larger 
cosponsorship networks were able to increase their own legislative influence and power. Fowler 
finds that the “denser” of a network of cosponsors a MC has worked with, the more likely it is 
that their bills or amendments will pass the floor. As discussed in the section above, maintaining 
legislative influence is crucial for incumbents attempting to survive tough elections. Thus, 
vulnerable legislators face significant incentives to engage in cosponsorship (whether partisan or 
bipartisan) to build their own legislative influence.  
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Despite recent spikes in highly partisan voting behavior in the US House, Laurel 
Harbridge (2009) finds that cosponsorship behavior tends to be much more bipartisan than roll 
call voting behavior. She notes that recently MCs have moved from roll call voting to 
cosponsorship as their primary means of establishing bipartisan credentials. While only finding 
results of MCs facing tough general election competition, Harbridge’s findings are nonetheless 
valuable to understanding cosponsorship. She finds that by engaging in largely bipartisan 
cosponsorship MCs can bolster their support among independents and “party leaners” (2009. v). 
While bipartisan cosponsorship also hurts vulnerable MCs support among party loyalty, they 
often still manage to hold onto their seats.  
Redistricting Literature 
        One final area of literature related to this project focuses on the effects of redistricting. 
The literature in this area focuses on specific episodes of redistricting and the electoral 
consequences of different methods of drawing district lines. One important lesson from this area 
of research comes from a study by David T. Canon, Matthew M. Schousen and Patrick J. Sellers 
(1996). They find that redistricting can give minority groups a voice in the political process, 
forcing MCs to cater their policies to appease these groups. As detailed in the sections above, 
cosponsorship is one method that MCs have to appease minority groups.  
III. Theory 
 Up to this point I have regularly used the idea of “legislative behavior” to describe 
changes MCs can make to hold onto power. Legislative behavior encompasses how partisan (or 
bipartisan) of an agenda a MC pursues through voting, sponsorship, and even floor speeches. 
Cosponsorship behavior is the central type of legislative behavior I am interested in studying. 
When facing a changing district I expect MC to change what kinds of legislation they sponsor.  
One way of doing this that is somewhat difficult to measure would be cosponsoring legislation 
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that has broad support among a MC’s constituents. For example, if a MC’s district were changed 
to include a large community of LGBT supporters, I would expect that MC to begin sponsoring 
more LGBT-friendly legislation. However it is rare that a change to a MC’s district would only 
change their behavior on one legislative issue. Rather I expect that MCs will need to change their 
position on multiple issues to respond to changes in the district. Consider a Democratic MC 
whose new district includes a large amount of rural, Conservative voters. To survive this 
scenario, this MC will likely try to balance these new constituents by cosponsoring more 
bipartisan legislation in an attempt to move to the middle.  
While there are many ways that a MC can change their behavior to appease a new 
district, I expect to find the biggest change in their cosponsorship behavior. One reason for this is 
the fact that cosponsorship is much more public than roll call voting. Even though MCs can 
publish how they vote, and frequently do, this isn’t nearly as strong of a statement as 
cosponsorship. By cosponsoring legislation a representative can take ownership of a specific 
legislative issue supported by their constituents. Furthermore, by developing cosponsorship 
networks with other legislators, a representative can increase their own influence, giving them 
more opportunities to appeal to new constituents. Cosponsorship also allows MCs to take 
positions on legislation that they have not received a chance to vote on. Consider again the MC 
whose district is redrawn to include a military base and a large number of military families. This 
MC will want to adjust their positions to appease these new voters, but suppose they also do not 
sit on any of the crucial committees like House Armed Services or Veterans Affairs. In this 
scenario this MC can cosponsor pieces of legislation sitting before the committee without 
actually being on the committee. This allows a representative to take stances on issues through 
cosponsorship that they might otherwise be unable to take.  
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Because of all of the political benefits of engaging in bipartisan cosponsorship, I expected 
that MCs who faced significant changes in district partisanship would adjust their cosponsorship 
behavior in response to their district. This lead to my first hypothesis:  
H1:  Changes in district partisan competitiveness will cause a change in bipartisan 
cosponsorship behavior.  
 
However, I quickly learned that when examining how MCs respond to changes in their districts it 
is important to take into account not only how much a district changes in partisanship, but also 
the impact of that change on the total partisanship of the district. Before expanding on this 
further, it is necessary to briefly explain how Cook PVI is calculated and what exactly it 
measures. A more detailed explanation of Cook PVI is included in the Research Design.  Cook 
PVI scores are calculated by taking the difference between the percentage of the vote that a 
Presidential candidate of one party receives in the district and the percentage of the vote that 
same candidate receives nationwide. This difference is used to generate a number, typically 
preceded by a letter (D or R) to signify the partisan direction of the district. So for example, 
Colorado’s 1st Congressional District was rated D+18 in 2014, while Colorado’s 4th 
Congressional District was rated R+12. While Cook PVI is an excellent measure of district 
partisanship, it does have one weakness when trying to study changes in PVI. A decrease in 
Cook PVI score of 5 points has drastically different impacts for a MC in a +40 district than a MC 
in a +8 district. Changes in district competitiveness are much more likely to have an impact on 
MCs who serve in “volatile” districts that are close to changing in partisanship. For this reason, I 
want to focus specifically on these vulnerable MCs serving in volatile districts. This leads to my 
second hypothesis:  
H2: For Members of Congress serving in politically volatile districts, changes in district 
partisan competitiveness will cause an increase their bipartisan cosponsorship.  
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 For the purpose of this study, I defined volatile districts that flipped to supporting the opposing 
party, or came within a certain threshold of flipping. How exactly this “volatility” was 
determined will be explain in detail in the Research Design. For the purpose of this paper, I will 
be focusing exclusively on the second hypothesis.  
IV. Research Design/Data 
 
To test my hypotheses I created a regression model to study the impacts that changes in 
district competitiveness have on cosponsorship behavior. I chose to focus on the US House of 
Representatives between 1973 and 2005 for my study. I chose to look at the House of 
Representatives, instead of the Senate, because Congressional districts change in partisanship 
more frequently and in greater amounts than whole states do. I chose to look specifically at the 
period from the 1973 to 2005 because during that time period regional factors were less relevant 
that during pervious decades. Another motivation for looking at this time period in particular is 
to evaluate the change in bipartisan cosponsorship over time, to evaluate whether Congress is 
more bipartisan or less bipartisan now than it was in the 1970s.  
To measure changes in district competitiveness I used Cook PVI Data across Congresses 
to measure change in electoral competitiveness of a district. As explained above, Cook PVI is 
calculated by evaluating the difference between Presidential election results by district and 
nationally to generate a score for the district. Political strategists and journalists frequently use 
this measure to judge how partisan different districts are. One of the benefits of Cook PVI scores 
is that they measure partisan competition in a district, free from an individual MC’s popularity in 
their district. 
However, because Cook PVI Data scores have only been compiled since 1997 I 
reconstructed data on PVI scores before that year. To do this I used election data gathered by 
James Snyder that measures Presidential election results by Congressional district.  
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One disadvantage of evaluating changes in Cook PVI scores is the same amount of 
change in PVI has a different impact for different levels of starting PVI. To account for this, I 
created three dummy variables to isolate MCs who serving in politically volatile districts, and 
thus are most likely to be affected by a change in PVI. The first variable “flip” captures MCs 
whose Cook PVI scores flip to be in favor of the opposing party. The second and third variables 
are designed to each capture a slightly larger number of volatile districts. The second variable, 
“scared” captures MCs who are within 2 points of flipping, while the third variable “worried” 
captures MCs who are within 5 points of flipping.  
To measure cosponsorship behavior I used data from Laurel Harbridge and James Fowler 
on bipartisan cosponsorship. These data measure both the raw number and percentage of bills 
that a member cosponsors during one session of Congress where 20, 30, 40, or 50 percent of a 
bill’s sponsors are from another party. However for my model I only used the 20% measure. I 
compared a representative’s cosponsorship across Congresses to generate a “change in 
cosponsorship behavior” score. A significant advantage of using these scores is that they 
measure the percentage of a MCs total cosponsorship that is bipartisan. This allows me to 
evaluate the impact the change in district competitiveness have on a MCs overall cosponsorship 
behavior.  
One of the biggest advantages to this method of research is that it allows for evaluating a 
specific member’s behavior over time, holding other things constant. One disadvantage of this 
specific research design is the possibility of a MC’s retirement censoring valuable data. If a MC 
decides to retire before redistricting takes effect, or if they are unable to win reelection in their 
new district, I cannot determine if a change in the competitiveness of their district changed their 
legislative behavior.    
 V. Results 
My research question asks, how do Members of Congress change their legislative behavior in 
response to changes in district partisanship. I hypothesized that MCs would increase their level 
of bipartisan cosponsorship to in response to changes in district co
while MCs don’t change their behavior in response to changes in district competitiveness, 
volatile districts are much more likely than safe districts to have bipartisan legislators. Before 
exploring these results in-depth, it is
variables I used in my regression. To evaluate cosponsorship I used two main dependent 
Variables, “Change in Cosponsorship” and “Cosponsorship.” The summary table below shows 
the average, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation for each dependent variable.
Note: PVI is shown here as an absolute change, where 
Directional PVI was used, which is explained below. Absolute PVI was used her to better illustrate the variance 
in changes in PVI. 
 
The low average, yet high standard deviation for Change in Cosponsorship suggests that 
changes in cosponsorship do occur, but that there are almost as many MCs who don’t change 
their behavior substantially as there are MCs who do make a substantial change in behavior. The 
average for Cosponsorship also suggests that bipartisan cosponsorship is quite common, at least 
in the US House between 1973 and 2005
cosponsorship scores across the time period, there was a slight decrease in both 
Cosponsorship and Cosponsorship from 1973 to 2005 (see Appendix for year breakdowns). 
mpetitiveness.
 necessary to begin with some basic information about the 
-5 and +5 are treated the same. In the actual analysis, 
. While there wasn’t a significant change in 
Change in 
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 I found that 
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To evaluate district partisan competitiveness I used Cook PVI as my main independent 
variable. Above, the summary table shows the average, minimum, and maximum for both 
Change in PVI, and raw PVI. For my regression, I used Change in PVI as my primary 
independent variable. However, instead of using Change in PVI directly, I created another 
variable called “Directional PVI.” Directional PVI measures a district’s change in PVI, but with 
respect to its original position. A change towards the partisan end of the spectrum is represented 
with positive values, while a change towards the bipartisan end of the spectrum is represented 
with negative values. Once I created the measurement of Directional PVI, I interacted it with 
three dummy variables, Flip, Worried, and Scared. The Flip variable captured a district that 
changed in partisanship, while Scared and Worried captured districts that came within 2 or 5 
points of flipping, respectively. Below is a chart showing the overall number of Flip, Worried, 
and Scared district over the course of the sample. Despite some outliers, the graph shows that the 
number of volatile districts stayed relatively the same from 1973 to 2005. The most notable 
outlier is 1973, where there were 236 districts that came within at least 5 points of flipping, but 
no districts totally flipped. A likely explanation for this effect is the Republican landslide in in 
the 1972 Presidential Election. Nixon’s strong performance in the Presidential election shifted 
many Democratic districts close to flipping, but wasn’t totally able to flip any single district.  
 When looking specifically at MCs that fell into one of the three categories I found no 
significant relationship between changes in district partisanship and changes in MCs bipartisan 
cosponsorship. Below are the results of the regression using Change in Cospons
main dependent variable. Table 1 shows the results for MCs whose districts have flipped to 
supporting another party. Even in this extreme case, there is not a significant relationship 
between the two variables. Tables 2 and 3 show the results
“scared” and “worried” respectively. Neither of these cases 
between Change in Cosponsorship and Directional PVI
Table 1 
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 Table 3 
These findings suggests that representative
in response to changes in district partisanship, or at the very least, change it at a slower rate than 
is captured by this model. Another possibility is that many of these MCs actually change their 
behavior, but were still voted out of office. 
However, when using the original bipartisan cosponsorship score as my dependent variable, 
instead of the change in cosponsorship, I found a significant relationship. 
of the regression model using Cosponsorship as the main dependent variable. In Table 4, even in 
the extreme case of MCs whose districts flip, the model shows a significant relationship between 
changes in PVI represented by Directional PVI, and Bipartisan Cosponsorship. Tables 5 an
show the results for the same regression using “scared” and “worried” MCs respectively. In both 
of these cases, not only is the relationship between the two variables significant, but also the 
coefficients are larger. This indicates that for members wh
still remain somewhat in their favor, they have a greater likelihood of increasing their 
cosponsorship scores. One likely explanation for this outcome is that on the whole, these MCs 
are much more likely to retain the
districts flipped may have changed their bipartisan cosponsorship 
colleagues in safer volatile district, but nonetheless been voted out of office by their constituents. 
 
 
 
 
 
s are unlikely to change their cosponsorship behavior 
 
Below are the results 
o district come close to changing, but 
ir seats than their colleagues whose districts flip. MCs whose 
to the same extent as their 
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d 6 
 
 Table 4 
Table 5 
Table 6 
These finding suggest that volatile districts are much more likely than safe districts to have 
bipartisan legislators. There are two possible explanations for this outcome: either these districts 
slowly sort out partisan legislators, or that these district
more bipartisan legislators to begin with. 
VI. Discussion 
This model indicates that, at least for the US House of Representatives between 1973 and 
2005, changes in district partisanship do not cause significant chang
cosponsorship. One likely explanation
are simply not able to change their behavior fast enough for voters to 
Another possibility is that even when MCs change their behavior, voters still make choices based 
on their previous behavior and vote them out of office. 
of the marginality hypothesis that also found no connection
margins and MC’s responsiveness to constituents. Morris P. 
were concerned about their chances for reelection were still unlikely to change their voting 
s have a selection bias towards electing 
 
es in bipartisan
 for the lack of significant change in behavior is that MCs 
believe they have changed
This finding agrees with previous studies 
 between decreasing electoral 
Fiorina found that even MCs that 
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behavior (1973). Additionally Jeffrey E. Cohen and Gregory G. Brunk found that vulnerable 
MCs were unlikely to change their party voting behavior (1983). However, my findings also 
disagree with some previous studies of legislative behavior that focused on how incumbents 
were able to fend off strong electoral challengers. While I found not change in the behavior of 
vulnerable MCs in response to changes in their district, Kenneth N. Bickers and Robert M. Stein 
found that vulnerable MCs were able to use discretionary awards to fend off quality electoral 
challengers (1996). Additionally John R. Hibbing found that vulnerable MCs would use the 
power of their office in an attempt to gain the support of certain groups (1984).  
While some MCs like Representative Coffman are able to survive reelection in volatile 
districts, this is likely not due to a simple change in cosponsorship behavior. Daniel Lipinski’s 
observation that voters place member messages about their behavior in the context of previous 
behavior is important to understanding this phenomenon. Even if a MC is able to change their 
voting and cosponsorship behavior to cater to their new district preferences, their constituents 
may see their change as dishonest and vote them out of office.  This presents an interesting area 
for further research. Future studies could analyze how constituents perceive their 
Representative’s (or any MCs) changed behavior on a legislative issue to see if voters see change 
as an improvement in behavior, or a dishonest political move.  
Members of Congress who survive reelection in politically volatile districts likely do so 
as a result of an array of strategic choices. Changes in bipartisan cosponsorship alone are not 
enough to protect a vulnerable MC facing reelection. Another area for future research could 
focus on is what kinds of messages vulnerable MCs send to their constituents about their job 
performance. By evaluating the content of MCs messages about their performance, future studies 
could better understand how MCs respond to changing constituencies and changing district 
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partisanship. After establishing what kinds of messages MCs send about their behavior in 
Congress, future studies could analyze if MCs messages about changed behavior match their 
change in behavior. 
However I did find a significant relationship between changes in district partisanship and raw 
bipartisan cosponsorship scores for MCs serving in politically volatile districts. This finding 
indicates that volatile districts have a selection bias towards electing bipartisan legislators. This 
indicates another interesting possibility for future research. Future studies could test how long 
MCs serving in these volatile districts remain in office. If there is a low attrition rate, that is MCs 
manage to stay in office in volatile districts long, it would suggest that these districts have a 
selection bias towards electing more bipartisan members of Congress. A high attrition rate would 
suggest a gradual narrowing process, where MCs become more bipartisan as they learn lessons 
from their retired colleagues behavior.  
My original motivation for starting this research project was to understand the causes of 
partisan dysfunction in Congress. Understanding what motivates MCs to engage in bipartisan 
behavior is important to explaining how partisan dysfunction occurs in Congress. While there 
was little variation over time in the amount of volatile districts in Congress, there are fewer 
volatile districts at the end of the sample than at the beginning. This suggests that the number of 
volatile districts is decreasing, while politically safer districts become more commonplace. If this 
decrease in volatile districts continues, then bipartisan cosponsorship in Congress will likely 
decrease as well. These findings have implications for both our understanding of redistricting 
and Congressional behavior. When redistricting commissions meet to draw new district lines, 
they should consider the effect that creating safe districts has on Congressional behavior.   
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